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THE GROWING DISJUNCTION BETWEEN
LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: A POSTSCRIPT
Harry T. Edwards*

In October 1992, in the pages of this law review, I expressed my
deep concern about "the growing disjunction between legal education
and the legal profession," in an article with the same title. 1 My thesis
was as follows:
I fear that our law schools and law firms are moving in opposite directions. The schools should be training ethical practitioners and producing scholarship that judges, legislators, and practitioners can use. The
firms should be ensuring that associates and partners practice law in an
ethical manner. But many law schools - especially the so-called "elite"
ones - have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy. Many law
firms have also abandoned their place, by pursuing profit above all else.
While the schools are moving toward pure theory, the firms are moving
toward pure commerce, and the middle ground - ethical practice has been deserted by both....
This article is my response to ... legal academicians who disdain law
teaching as an endeavor in pursuit of professional education. My view is
that if law schools continue to stray from their principal mission of professional scholarship and training, the disjunction between legal education and the legal profession will grow and society will be the worse for
it. 2

The response to the article has been nothing short of extraordinary.
Humility causes me to understand that this has had more to do with
the subject than with the author.
In my experience, it is rare for a law review article to touch a nerve
• Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. B.S.
1962, Cornell; J.D. 1965, University of Michigan. Judge Edwards practiced law with Seyfarth,
Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson in Chicago, Illinois, between 1965 and 1970; he then served as a
tenured professor oflaw at Michigan Law School (1970-75, 1977-80) and Harvard Law School
(1975-77). Since joining the D.C. Circuit in 1980, he has continued to teach part-time at various
law schools, including Pennsylvania, Harvard, Duke, Georgetown, Michigan and, most recently,
New York University. - Ed.
The author wishes to acknowledge and express his appreciation for the assistance of Brandt J.
Goldstein, J.D. 1992, Yale University, in the preparation of this article.
1. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992).
2. Id. at 34, 41.
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of public reaction. I wrote "The Growing Disjunction" because I felt
strongly that the "disjunction" of which I speak "calls into question
our status as an honorable profession." 3 In the article, I noted that I
had heard many others express similar concerns in recent years; 4 indeed, it was my view that, rather than saying something "wholly original,"5 I was articulating a set of concerns that already permeated the
legal community. I was unaware, however, that these concerns are as
deep and widespread in the legal community as the response to the
article suggests.
I recognize that the article deals with some issues that many members of the profession - for various reasons - have been unable or
unwilling to address. Given the response to the article, however, it is
clear that the subject of "The Growing Disjunction" does not cover
virgin territory; the article is novel only in the sense that it has focused
attention on matters of great concern to many. My view of the nature
and magnitude of the problems facing the academy and the profession
today is, of course, open to debate. 6 It may be, for instance, that I
have overstated the negative influence of "impractical" scholars and
scholarship. 7 But there can be little disagreement, I think, that we
presently face a serious problem in the legal profession. As a former
dean of an "elite" law school wrote, "[u]ndeniably, there is a great
deal of truth in what you had to say." 8
I have several reasons to believe that the article's subject has struck
a nerve. This symposium, of course, constitutes the most immediate
evidence of the interest in the disjunction between the teaching and the
practice of law. But the symposium is only one manifestation. The
Editor-in-Chief of this law review advised me that the decision to publish a symposium was made because "[t]he response [to the article] has
been so overwhelming"; he noted the "strong and widespread reac3. Id. at 34.
4. See id. at 35.
5. Id. at 41.
6. Cf. THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION, AMERICAN BAR AssO·
CIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT- AN EDUCATIONAL CON·
TINUUM (1992) 3, 330-34 (contending that there is less a "gap" between the academy and the
profession than a continuum of development in legal skills and values that includes law school
and practice; nevertheless, suggesting numerous reforms in legal education).
7. By "impractical" scholar, I mean one who "produces abstract scholarship that has little
relevance to concrete issues, or addresses concrete issues in a wholly theoretical manner." Edwards, supra note 1, at 35.
8. Law Professor #1, letter dated Nov. 25, 1992, at 1. (For the sake of convenience, and to
preserve the anonymity of persons who wrote to me, I have identified correspondents as either
"Law Professor#-,'' "Dean#-," "Practitioner#-," "Judge#-,'' "Student#-," or
"Recent Graduate #-." Copies of the letters from these correspondents are on file in my
chambers.)
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tion" to the article, stating that "[h]arclly a day has gone by during the
past month when we have not seen new evidence of its force, from the
Wall Street Journal article to calls and inquiries from academics and
law firms. " 9
My own experience has been much the same. I have been overwhelmed with oral and written responses to the article from law
school deans and faculty members, students, and members of the
bench and the bar. In particular, I was amazed by the number of law
professors who approached me to offer their views during the January
1993 meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. Almost
all those from whom I have heard agree that the legal community
faces a significant problem. Further, there already has been some recognition of the problem at the institutional level: I have been told that
a number of law schools have held or are planning to hold special
seminars, faculty retreats, and other programs to debate the issues that
are the subject of the article. Discussion of the article has even made
its way into the popular legal press 10 and national media. 11
In this essay I offer a postscript to "The Growing Disjunction." It
is not possible for me to "respond" directly to the other participants in
this symposium, because I had no opportunity before publication to
read what they have written. I will therefore limit myself to two tasks.
First, I will briefly discuss several issues raised in the article. Second,
and most important, I wish to share a representative sample of the
responses I have received regarding the article. These responses, I
think, provide good evidence of the magnitude of the problem that we
face.

I.

REsPONSES TO THE ARTICLE: SOME INITIAL OBSERVATIONS

Although much of the original article was based on my own perspective and experience as a practicing lawyer, law professor, and now
judge, I also relied heavily upon a survey of my former clerks as a
source of information about the current relationship between legal education and legal practice. That survey provided many additional insights and illuminating examples, but its primary effect was to
reinforce my views about the disjunction between the academy and the
9. Letter from Gregory P. Magarian, Editor-in-Chief, Michigan Law Review, to Harry T.
Edwards, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 1 (Jan. 13, 1993) (on file with
author).
10. See Eva M. Rodriguez, Critical of Legal Studies, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 30, 1992, at 6.
11. See Ted Gest, Doing Good is Doing Well, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 22, 1993, at
60; Junda Woo, Law Schools Accused of Ignoring Basics, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1992, at B4.
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profession. The multitude of responses I have received regarding the
article have, for the most part, further reinforced those views.
Of the many observations the responses offered concerning legal
education, three issues emerged in particular. Perhaps the problem of
greatest concern is the growing tension in a number of law school faculties over hiring decisions, a tension born of deep divisions within
those faculties. A number of the communications I received observed,
with much distress, that faculties often are badly split, with the more
traditional, practical scholars on one side of the divide, and the "law
and,'' "impractical" scholars (almost invariably a younger lot) on the
other side. This division in the academy is, it seems, frequently permeated by rancor, contempt, and ill will. The practical scholars at times
are befuddled, even disgusted, by what they perceive as scholarship of
questionable quality, engulfed by obfuscatory nomenclature, with no
apparent relevance outside of the small conversation that takes place
among the group of legal academics who write and speak in that nomenclature, be it critical legal studies (CLS), critical race studies, law
and economics, or another area. For their part, the "impractical"
scholars often view their doctrine-oriented colleagues as engaged in
"uninteresting" work, unworthy of pursuit by true intellectuals.
Moreover, as several responses observed, it is not uncommon for
the "impractical" scholars to unite in a bloc that espouses a distinctive
political agenda. As a consequence, the hiring process may be as
much about stacking the deck in favor of a particular political position
as it is about attracting promising, creative, productive legal minds.
A second concern, highlighted by the responses I have received, is
the growing imbalance in law school pedagogy, with too much emphasis on theory at the expense of a basic doctrinal education. This imbalance, of course, is attributable in large part to the increasing number
of "impractical" scholars on law faculties who are neither capable of,
nor interested in, teaching doctrine-rich courses (and who, when required to teach basic first-year classes such as contracts or property,
often abandon any attempt to instill doctrinal literacy in their students). This growing disinterest in providing students a solid, rigorous
foundation in doctrine seems, in some cases, to have extended beyond
individual courses to the way in which the first-year curriculum is organized. One law professor at a major eastern school expressed dismay over an "experimental [first-year] section run mainly by
'impracticals,'" which attempts to blend all of torts and contracts into
a single, four credit-hour class. 12
12. Law Professor #2, letter dated Dec. 21, 1992, at 2.
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Third, the responses confirmed my original fear that a good
number of law professors are altogether uninterested in producing
scholarship useful to practicing lawyers, judges, administrators, and
legislators. 13 Concern about the breakdown in communication between academics and practitioners came from both sides of the divide.
A professor at a major west coast law school lamented the view of one
of his colleagues that "legal scholars should address their work exclusively to each other." 14 A named partner of a major Washington, D.C.,
law firm expressed his dismay about being unable even to understand
some of the scholarship produced today, "where words and concepts
seem to be employed to obscure rather than inform and appear to be
addressed to an audience of one (the author!) or perhaps a few esoteric
colleagues." 15 These comments are typical of many that I received.
The responses I received also expressed concerns about ethical
problems in the legal profession. Senior and managing partners from
several major law firms emphasized the importance of preserving the
honorable status of the profession, particularly its sense of public obligation. And a number of attorneys voiced distress over the apparently
cavalier attitude that many law schools take to teaching ethics today.
The pool of responses I received tended to confirm in significant
measure the concerns raised in the article; however, some questions
were raised about the article suggesting that aspects of my thesis might
have been misconstrued by some. Several points are worth mentioning
to dispel possible misconceptions. First, I am not against theory or
theoretical work. 16 In my view, the ideal law school includes "a
healthy balance" 17 of practical and theoretical teaching and scholarship. Indeed, even in courses geared toward doctrinal literacy, one
13. It seems that not all of those who appear actively to endorse the "impractical" component of legal education necessarily take this stance in their scholarship. In particular, I have in
mind Professor George Priest, who has advocated a "graduate school" model of the law school
that I have already indicated I reject. See George L. Priest, The Increasing Division Between
Legal Practice and Legal Education, 37 BuFF. L. R.Ev. 681 (1988-1989). Recently, Professor
Priest sent me a letter discussing the Program in Civil Liability (PCL) at Yale Law School, a
"research unit" engaged in "advanced research on civil liability topics"; the most recent conference held by the PCL, Professor Priest said, addressed "issues relating to the increasing complexity of modern civil litigation." Letter from George L. Priest to Harry T. Edwards, Judge, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 1 (Nov. 25, 1992) (on file with author).
14. Law Professor #3, letter dated Dec. 16, 1992, at 1 (emphasis added).
15. Practitioner #1, letter dated Nov. 25, 1992, at 1.
16. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 35 ("I should make clear at the outset that I do not doubt
for a moment the importance of theory in legal scholarship."); id. at 39 ("I emphasize, again,
that a great professional school never can be antitheoretical."); id. at 65 ("I repeat that, in advancing my claim for 'doctrinal education,' I do not propose that law schools eliminate theory
from their curricula.").
17. Id. at 36.
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cannot teach, or learn, without a theoretical construct. 18
Second, I am not against interdisciplinary scholarship. I agree
with the dean of an "elite" law school who stated to me his belief that
"interdisciplinary work should enrich and not displace an emphasis on
Law." 19 Twenty years ago, I joined others in the decision to add psychiatrists, sociologists, and economists to the law faculty at the University of Michigan, and I spent a number of years team-teaching with
psychiatrists. Then, as now, it should be clear that research and teaching in courses ranging from criminal law to negotiation are significantly enhanced by the insights of, for instance, psychology and
sociology. Many other examples could be cited; but, as I have emphasized, that does not mean that "[t]he entire array of graduate schools
[should] be duplicated, in microcosm, in the law school."20
Third, I am not interested in "trashing" CLS. Nor do I oppose the
work of scholars devoted to critical race theory or feminist legal studies. I continue to believe that "critical" scholars "have the potential to
be valuable additions to the law school. [Such] scholars have provided
a critical, anti-establishment view that, in the past, was largely absent
from the law schools."21 What troubles me most about some adherents of CLS is that their attempts to expose fundamental flaws in our
legal system are not accompanied by any comprehensible suggestions
for reform. This is truly ironic, for it is distinctively the lawyer's domain (unlike, say, that of the political philosopher) to deal with concrete, institutional realities. 22
18. For example, I do not see how one could effectively teach a course in federal courts
without considerable discussion about theories of federal jurisdiction, such as the one developed
by Professor Hart. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953) (Congress' exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may not "destroy the essential role" of
the Court).
19. Dean #1, letter dated Dec. 4, 1992, at 1.
20. Edwards, supra note l, at 56. For a discussion of practical interdisciplinary scholarship
in the area of mental health law, see David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing
Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAVORIAL ScI. & L. 17 (1993). Professor Wexler analyzes a number of articles - directed to judges, legislators, and other public decisionmakcrs that address concrete problems in mental health law. See id. at 21-28.
21. Edwards, supra note 1, at 49.
22. In suggesting that legal scholarship should seek to solve concrete problems, I do not
mean that legal scholarship properly consists of political tract-writing:
Some of the propositions of critical ... studies are removed not only from legal analysis,
but from the idea of scholarship. When organized labor is tacitly criticized for its failure to
form a political party, or when the call is made to restructure the "Western wage labor
system" we are not being offered disciplinary propositions about law; and legal periodicals
seem curious pulpit& for these appeals.
Matthew W. Finkin, Reflections on Labor Law Scholarship and Its Discontents: The Re~·eries of
Monsieur Verog, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1101, 1145 (1992) (footnotes omitted). Professor Finkin's
article highlights, with both force and humor, many of 'the problems of contemporary legal
scholarship.
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Finally, I do not believe that legal education should be structured
to prepare students only for appearing before judges. Most lawyers
rarely appear in court, and we should not design the entire law school
curriculum as if the opposite were true. Nor do I believe that an emphasis on the practical in legal education should be limited to doctrine.
The value of high quality clinical courses is self-evident. Likewise,
courses focused on the legislative and executive branches enable students to consider important policy questions, understand problems related to drafting and enacting legislation, and develop the ability to
deal with executive enforcement measures and administrative regulations. Further, it would be immensely useful if law schools offered
courses designed to train students how to manage legal institutions,
since the delivery of quality legal services often depends upon the quality of the organization in which a lawyer works. In short, I do not,
endorse the study of doctrine to the exclusion of all else.
II.

A

SAMPLE OF THE REsPONSES FROM THE LEGAL
COMMUNITY

My principal thesis has been set forth and defended in detail in
"The Growing Disjunction." Thus, there is no point in rehashing arguments that I already have made. Rather, I think it more useful to
share selections from some of the numerous unsolicited responses I
have received, from all quarters of the legal community, regarding the
original article. Most of the respondents expressed concerns similar to
mine; not all were in agreement with me, however, so I have included
some dissenting voices as well. 23 I am well aware that this sample
could be construed as "biased," for those who agreed with the article
may have been more likely to communicate with me than those who
did not. Therefore, I can say no more than that this collection of responses is illustrative, not authoritative.
I have organized the respondents' remarks into five categories: (1)
law school deans, (2) law school faculty members, (3) students and
recent graduates, (4) members of the bar, and (5) judges. Classifying
the various sources of the responses by position not only highlights the
distinct perspectives of each group but, more importantly, emphasizes
the striking similarities in the concerns expressed across groups. To
preserve the anonymity of the respondents, I have omitted the names
of individuals and institutions.
23. I have heard from many more people than I am able to cite. The responses presented
here are, I believe, a fair sample of those that I received.
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A. Law School Deans
Because of their institutional responsibilities, the deans who wrote
or spoke to me predictably discussed, first and foremost, their concerns about hiring new faculty members; a number also addressed the
issue of "impractical" scholarship. A few were content simply to offer
brief notes of praise ("spectacular" was the excessive accolade from
the dean of a major east coast law school24) or concurrence ("I . . .
agree with much of what you say," as the dean of one "elite" law
school put it25).
The dean of another "elite" law school offered this perspective on
the influx of interdisciplinary and theory-oriented scholars and the influence those scholars will have on the next generation of academics:
In my judgment, the problem began in the late '60's when an increasing
number of individuals who aspired to become history professors or economics professors or philosophy professors or political science professors
or literature professors discovered that there were few, if any, opportunities in those fields. After spending several years doing graduate work,
they finally faced reality and attended law school.
Most of these individuals had no real interest in law or in becoming a
lawyer, but many were excellent students. As a result, they were hired
by law faculties, particularly in the elite schools, in increasing numbers.
After obtaining tenure, many of them began moving back towards their
real academic interests - philosophy, political science, economics, history, literature, etc. This led to an explosion of interdisciplinary work in
law, as well as to an increasing rejection of the importance of doctrinal
analysis even in mainstream courses.
Today, this generation of scholars is dominant in legal education,
and their priorities hold sway. Moreover, the problem is compounded
by the fact that these very same academics tend to encourage only those
of their students who are themselves interested in interdisciplinary work
to consider careers in academia. And those students who are not interested in interdisciplinary work, but are merely extraordinarily talented
lawyers, shy away from a career in the academy because they know that
the kind of work that they would be interested in doing is not valued. As
a consequence, virtually all of the applicants law schools like ours receive for positions in teaching come from individuals with a strong interdisciplinary bent. Although I regard interdisciplinary work as valuable,
it should always be an enhancement of, rather than a substitute for, more
traditional legal scholarship. In any event, the problem becomes selfperpetuating. 26

Although the majority of law school professors' responses are cited
in section Il.B, I include two of those responses here because they
24. Dean #7, letter dated Nov. 30, 1992, at 1.
25. Dean #2, letter dated Dec. 22, 1992, at 1.
26. Dean #1, letter dated Dec. 4, 1992, at 2.
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follow so naturally from the letter just quoted. The first of these letters is from a professor at a major eastern law school, who attempts to
identify the political and ideological dimension of the shift in faculty
interests and the attendant influence on the hiring process:
Many, although not all, of the legal theorists would like to bring about a
radical transformation of society. In many cases, their work amounts to
an attack on classical liberalism, which they would like to see replaced
with a philosophical or political theory that will lead to a much more
egalitarian society. These professors think they can accomplish their
goal not only through their scholarship, but also by indoctrinating their
students and by having the law school and the university take official
positions on their side of controversial issues of public policy.... These
latter methods will not work well unless like-minded professors dominate the faculty. Thus, it is critical that professors who tend to accept
the status quo be excluded from the faculty or at least have their influence minimized.
I believe that professors who are interested in engaging in practical
scholarship generally tend to desire incremental change rather than radical change. These professors are likely to teach their students that our
present legal system is not irredeemably flawed and corrupt; rather, it
has many desirable features and often works quite well. In addition,
these professors cannot be counted upon always to toe the line and support the theorists' proposed faculty resolutions on issues of public policy.
Finally, "practical" scholars are often unsympathetic to the scholarship
of the pure theorists, some of which they might regard as political tractwriting masquerading as legal scholarship. Thus, if the theorists vote to
appoint a "practical" scholar to the faculty, they might find it more difficult to gain faculty support in the future for the appointment of another
like-minded theorist. These reasons, I think, are a significant part of the
explanation of why many legal theorists are hostile to practical scholarship and practical pedagogy.21
The hiring environment described by the foregoing two letters has
led a preeminent treatise writer and chaired professor of law at a major law school to believe that his chances would be dim were he seeking a teaching job today:
The developments you describe are certainly quite apparent here at
my school, and I am sure that we are far from the worst. If I were
leaving a clerkship and hoping to enter the teaching market today, with
exactly the credentials I had 42 years ago, I am absolutely confident that
I could not be hired on this faculty. Indeed ... I feel reasonably confident that I would not even be invited here for interviews.
I can well imagine the Appointments Committee sniffing over my
27. Law Professor #4, letter dated Dec. 22, 1992, at 1-2; see also Mark Tushnet, Critical
Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1516 (1991) (The author argues that
"critical legal studies is a political location for a group of people on the Left who share the
project of supporting and extending the domain of the Left in the legal academy.").
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application. "Second in the class at [an elite institution]. There are lots
of people with that kind of credential." "Officer of the [law review]. But
we have editors-in-chief that we are not even bringing down." "Clerk
for [a noted federal appellate judge]. He is a good enough circuit judge,
but think of all the Supreme Court clerks we have interviewed." Then
would come the final and fatal blow: "His only degree is an LL.B. I
think we shoul[d] be looking for people who have a second degree in
something other than law." 28

I think it self-evident that this series of letters describes a deeply
troubling state of affairs in the hiring of young professors, and the
responses of several deans indicate that I am not alone in this view.
The dean of a small law school in the northwest offered an anecdote
that illustrates the problems a would-be "traditional" legal scholar
may face in seeking academic employment:
I agree with most of what you have to say, and it brings to mind a whimsical recounting of the faculty hiring process at another school, passed
along by one of our recent [visiting scholars]. A superior candidate came
through the process, but the candidate ran into substantial opposition
from a powerful sub-set of the faculty who complained that the candidate was not committed to "law and something." The apt response from
our [visiting scholar] was: "Oh yes. The candidate is committed to law
and law. " 29

Given the attitude among faculty that a young scholar must have
"something" up his or her sleeve in addition to law, it is probably not
remarkable that so many of those who seek teaching positions today
style themselves as "law and" scholars or theoreticians. It may even
be that some potential scholars who are interested in "law and law"
are marketing themselves as something "more" in order to be hired, a
view suggested by the dean of a large law school in the midwest:
In recent years, I have been struck by the number of young legal
scholars who seem to be much more inclined towards what you characterize as impractical scholarship. . . . I participated on a panel at the
AALS Faculty Recruitment Conference earlier this month and had an
opportunity to meet another crop of potential faculty members. Based
on some of my conversations with these and other young scholars, I am
still not sure whether their commitment to CLS, critical race theory, [or]
feminist legal theory is sincere or whether these young people have
somehow been convinced or have convinced themselves that this is the
only way to make a mark in legal education. 30

A discouraging assessment indeed.
Certain of the deans who responded to the article also had much to
say about the closely related issue of "impractical" professors' distaste,
28. Law Professor #5, letter dated Dec. 23, 1992, at 1-2.
29. Dean #3, letter dated Dec. 8, 1992, at 1.
30. Dean #4, letter dated Nov. 25, 1992, at 1.
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even contempt, for doctrinal scholarship, and their rejection of the existing legal system. This attitude deeply concerned the dean of a wellregarded law school on the east coast, formerly a chaired professor at
an "elite" law school:
I agree wholeheartedly with most of what you say and embrace the
overall substance of your thesis. . . .
What I find odd is that so many in the legal education profession are
members of a tight-knit group that is just "out of it." Academic life
simply takes these people away from reality....
The notion that the analysis of cases, the discussion of doctrinal concepts, the support for the existing legal system while trying to make it
work better, [are] somehow immoral and anti-intellectual drives me up
the wall. The so-called "theory" that is so much in vogue today as the
basis for what is written is often (though not inevitably) pure garbage.
Sorry, I mean impure garbage!
Law schools should not be mere trade schools; they are places of
higher learning. But they should deal with the realities of the procedural
and substantive laws that are vital to the functioning of our world and
the preservation of what is best about it. For those who only want to
thrash about in the "nether regions," trashing everyone and everything
who is productive, we need to develop a new school of legal thought and
theory in our universities. Let those who are involved spend their time
doing their idle musings, but don't pretend that their graduates are qualified to take the bar and enter the legal profession.3 1
Not every dean, however, believed that the problems discussed in
the original article affected his or her law school. One dean from an
"elite" law school was quite sanguine about the shared sense of purpose at his institution:
Although I do not agree with every point you make (in particular, I am
skeptical about the ability oflaw schools to teach legal ethics effectively),
the basic thrust of your argument is right on target. You may be surprised to learn, however, that I say this with a sense of some self-congratulation. Although too many lawyers and judges do not know it, [our
law school] prides itself on coming closest to the vision you offer of a
sound legal education. We have long held the view ... that the fiist and
foremost responsibility of a law school is to train its students to the profession of law and to contribute in a meaningful way to scholarly research about the profession. This is not to say, of course, that we do not
value interdisciplinary approaches to law. . . . But it has consistently
been our view that interdisciplinary work should enrich and not displace
an emphasis on Law.32
This dean was not entirely alone in his more upbeat assessment.
The dean at a small east coast law school wrote me twice, and his first
letter reflected a cautiously positive outlook:
31. Dean #5, letter dated Dec. 3, 1992, at 1-2.
32. Dean #1, letter dated Dec. 4, 1992, at 1.
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[The ABA Task Force Report33] concluded that there is not so much
an absolute gap - and certainly not divergence as to objectives - as
there is an unappreciated continuum of professional growth from law
school through a lawyer's career. I suggest the disjunction you and your
clerks perceive is neither as universal nor as intractable as you think. A
perusal of our library shelves tells me there is no shortage of "practical"
scholarship in the law reviews and elsewhere, and I know how profoundly our faculty struggles to assure that our curriculum balances doctrinal analysis, theoretical frameworks, skills training, and ethical
sensitivity. I suspect a survey of deans, or even of professors, would find
many more sharing your vision than not. 34

I wrote back to this dean, telling him that although I respected his
opinion, very few of those from whom I had heard concurred with his
view. A second letter from the dean arrived soon afterwards, stating
that my message had "deflated" him. He added:
I revise my position somewhat. The enclosed article from [an elite
law review] came to me recently. It is strong evidence for your position.
I do not know [the author] and do not mean to denigrate his knowledge
or skills. But, even after struggling to understand it, I do not immediately grasp how his [100]-page article in an elite journal is likely to be
helpful to mainstream practitioners. 35
In sum, if the responses I received from deans are even moderately

representative of the concerns of their counterparts at other institutions, then there is no dearth of support among law school leaders for
the view that there is a serious disjunction between the academy and
the profession.
B. Law School Faculty Members

It is perhaps not surprising that the majority of the responses I
received came from law professors, given that a principal focus of
"The Growing Disjunction" is law school faculties. Although some of
the respondents did not take my position, an extraordinary number of
them - from assistant professors at regional schools to preeminent
scholars at elite institutions - did agree that there is a tremendous
problem to be addressed. A number of respondents were terse in their
comments. For example, a former president of the Association of
American Law Schools, who is now a chaired professor of law at a
well-regarded east coast law school, expressed hope that the article
would contribute to "help[ing] legal education get itself out of its intellectual cul-de-sac." 36 Another chaired professor of law at a major law
33.
34.
35.
36.

See supra note 6.
Dean #6, letter dated Nov. 24, 1992, at 1.
Dean #6, letter dated Jan. 19, 1993, at 1.
Law Professor #6, letter dated Dec. 23, 1992, at 1.
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school on the east coast wrote: "I love your article. It reminds me of
many of the reasons I left [an 'elite' law school] . . . . As someone with
one foot in each camp (doctrine and big-think) I really appreciate your
expressing these thoughts in print."37
Many other letters offered more elaborate comment. I begin with
a renowned treatise writer and chaired professor of law at a major law
school who expressed, in emphatic terms, his belief that the recent
decline in practical scholarship carries with it highly detrimental
consequences:
I think that what you say is exactly right. Legal education is moving
away from the needs of the legal profession, it is doing so at an increasing pace, and this is a great loss. If you believe, as I do with all my heart,
that the rule of law is indispensable to a civilized society, then we need
good lawyers to be handmaidens of the law and good lawyers must understand doctrine and the "practical" side of the law as well as understanding theory. 38

This treatise writer's concern was reflected in many respondents'
attempts to explain and analyze the trend away from traditional, doctrinal scholarship and toward interdisciplinary and highly theoretical
work. Perhaps the harshest view of the growing emphasis on "impractical" scholarship came from a professor of law at a major law school
on the east coast:
[Y]ou may have been too easy on the "impractical ·scholars." You are
quite right to point out that they want to tum law schools into what I
like to call "Graduate Schools of Legal and Other Studies," but they
want to be paid like law professors rather than university professors.
The salaries at law schools are two or three times what universities pay
their grad-school professors. Someone receiving an economics or philosophy or you-name-it Ph.D. can go to law school, obtain a J.D., and then
go into "law &" teaching at a law school and earn two or three times
what they would earn in grad school, while teaching (and researching)
exact[ly] what they would teach or research in grad school.
So what we have here is an incredible scam. Our "impractical scholars" pursue what fascinates them, and the law schools that employ them
charge students $15,000 a year to learn stuff that will be of no use to
them. These professors teach in order to train students who will become
law professors (like them), which means perhaps three or four people out
of a class of [several hundred]. The rest of the students are being bilked!
You are absolutely on the mark when you note that at the "elite" law
schools the "impracticals" have taken over. This has occurred through
an unholy alliance of crits and law-and-economics people, with miscellaneous other "law &s" chipping in. A faculty candidate who is not heavily into theory has little cha[n]ce of being hired. ("Practical scholars"
37. Law Professor #7, letter dated Dec. 11, 1992, at 1.
38. Law Professor #5, letter dated Dec. 23, 1992, at 1.
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The former dean of a large, well-regarded law school in the midwest, who is presently a chaired professor at a prominent southern law
school, suggested that some young professors today may feel compelled to incorporate interdisciplinary work into their scholarship,
whether they like it or not:
You conclude on a hopeful note (at 77) that the professoriat as a whole is
still in control and, especially, that ·~unior professors can still ... expect
that fine doctrinal work will suffice for tenure ..." You temper this by
observing that their work "will probably need to have theory integrated
with doctrine, and to take the form of law review articles rather than
treatises." ... My problem with your statement is that you seem (and I
may do you an injustice here) to require (advise, counsel, accept as fact,
albeit with resignation) that the young person bow to demands to incorporate "Law And ..."-theoretical material, in order to ... touch all
bases in the faculty. Unhappily, and I know you neither meant to prescribe nor even to make a forecast, that may be a not too inaccurate
statement ... of what young people face or [at] least perceive (and the
perception makes it real in their anxiety about promotion and tenure). It
is in this area that I am far less sanguine than you. I really do fear that
"fine doctrinal work" will not count for what it once did. 40

Another chaired professor of law, from a large midwestem law
school, noted that the apparently increasing pressure to focus on theory or interdisciplinary work does not necessarily end with the granting of tenure:
In the article you asked why a tenured professor cannot simply
choose to engage in practical scholarship. I know the answer. Tenure
guarantees only a job. Tenure does not guarantee respect among colleagues, salary increases from deans, or support for research and writing
by anyone. The cost of practical scholarship, literally, can be very large,
but your speaking out on this important subject may well reduce this
cost.41

As if to guarantee that the disjunction will become worse, it appears that some law professors now consider the practice of law no
longer to be an important experience for the aspiring academic. A
chaired professor of law at a well-regarded midwestem law school related the following:
About five years ago, several of my colleagues interviewed a young
woman who had graduated from [an elite east coast law school] with
stellar credentials. She asked about the view at [our law school] regarding the desirability of practice experience. [My colleagues] responded
39. Law Professor #2, letter dated Dec. 21, 1992, at 1.
40. Law Professor #8, letter dated Jan. 11, 1993, at 2.
41. Law Professor #9, letter dated Dec. 17, 1992, at 2.
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that many faculty members thought that at least some exposure to practice was very important. "That's good to hear," she replied, because she
was seriously thinking about entering practice - but she had been advised by "friends on [her alma mater's] faculty" that practice experience
might be considered a blot on her record!42
Unfortunately, this professor's anecdote was not the only comment on
this subject. A U.S. Court of Appeals judge, who also teaches at an
"elite" law school, advised me that:
Many of the students who apply for a clerkship with me ... are now
telling me that what used to be the obligatory two to four years of practical experience after graduation before a return to academia is not only
no longer required, but also may put one in disfavor if the sojourn in the
world of practicality has lasted too long.43
Finally, a professor of law from a law school in the west pointed
out that these issues are not matters of concern solely at the "elite"
law schools:
I could not agree with you more [in believing that the academy is uninterested in the issues confronting the practicing lawyer] .... However,
the problem you describe is not distinctive to [the "elite" law schools]
since the law schools with lesser status like to imitate the more prestigious schools.
I was warned that my law degree would not qualify me to teach history at a liberal arts college as I hoped at the time I left law school. It
never occurred to me that I might convert this law school to a liberal
arts college instead. How nai[]ve of me. 44
In contrast to the respondents I have just quoted, chaired professor of law at an "elite" law school offered a less jaded vision of the
shift in scholarship:
My view as an insider and as a "law .and" type (but one who has
valued the doctrinal and the practical) is that the situation is not as bleak
as you describe it, and that to the extent the shifts you point to exist (I
would certainly not deny considerable movement in the directions you
specify) there are reasons which are not very different from those that
motivated professors in the days when doctrine was more dominant....

a

One might, of course, ask why have law professors directed more of
their attention to the kind of work designed to influence legislatures or
courts through ways other than the analysis of doctrine. I think this
change in focus reflects a feature that has not changed over the years,
coupled with something that has been perceived to change dramatically.
What I think has not changed is that most law professors see themselves
as critics of law who are criticizing not for its own sake (or to show off
their intelligence) but because they want to make a difference. And at
42. Law Professor #10, letter dated Nov. 25, 1992, at 1.
43. Judge #1, letter dated Feb. 5, 1993, at 1.
44. Law Professor #11, letter dated Dec. 17, 1992, at 1.
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the elite law schools the difference professors want to make has always
been at the highest levels, which is to say the federal courts and especially the Supreme Court. At one point (when you and I were in law
school) it was felt that if one could show a federal court (the Supreme
Court in particular) how the constraints of doctrine necessitated particular outcomes in apparently hard cases, the court's later decisions would
be influenced by the professor's analysis. Today it is felt that these hard
decisions are made by courts, even courts below the Supreme Court, on
political more than doctrinal grounds and that these grounds reflect the
world views that judges bring to their roles. Thus if the goal is to influence the law, doctrinal analysis appears less likely to have an important
effect than political arguments and empirical and theoretical research
(like law and economics) which can affect the world views of judges.
Are those who seek to influence the law in this way wrong? You are in a
better position to judge than I ....
. . . Finally, and I think in the recent period most importantly, is the
sense that our nation and the world face[] a host of serious problems
that intersect the law but which cannot be resolved on the basis of received legal doctrine. This has led many of our brightest young lawyers
to seek training in other disciplines and to do work that reflects that
training as much or more than it reflects their specifically legal training.
These young scholars do this not because they are uninterested in the
practical, but from the opposite motive. They think they can have the
greatest practical effect by looking at the empirical and theoretical underpinnings of doctrine and by seeking not to influence courts but rather
to influence other private and governmental actors. 45

To the extent that the foregoing position relies on the proposition that
judging is merely a "political" or "ideological" enterprise, I reject it. 46
Otherwise, the respondent's views reflect a scholarly ideal - wanting
to exert a positive influence on decisionmakers at the highest levels with which I probably agree·. Unfortunately, based on my own experiences and the vast majority of responses that I have received, this
ideal is far from a reality today.
A professor of law from a major law school on the west coast
echoed the view that scholarship that is not heavily doctrinal may nevertheless be "practical," partly by focusing on "governmental actors"
outside of the judiciary:
I don't think our views are particularly far apart. As you note in your
article, I believe legal scholarship consists, and should consist, of recommendations to public decisionmakers. [I have published an] article [that]
makes this argument, in response to [another scholar], who argues that
legal scholars should address their work exclusively to each other (and
you thought [some academics were] extreme). In this sense, we agree
that legal scholarship ought to be "practical," to use your term. But
45. Law Professor #12, letter dated Nov. 23, 1992, at 1-3.
46. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 837.
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your article tends to treat such practical scholarship as equivalent to
doctrinal scholarship; that will be true, however, only if the decisionmaker who is being addressed is a judge. In our statutory, regulatory state, legislators and administrators have assumed a dominant role,
and I think legal scholars limit the relevance and impact of their work if
they fail to address these decisionrnakers. (Moreover, since much of the
judicial role involves supervising agencies, analysis of agency decisions
should be relevant to them as well.) But practical scholarship addressed
to legislators and administrators cannot be primarily doctrinal, because
these decisionrnakers think in policy, not doctrinal terms. 47

Not everyone would agree with the view that legislators and administrators "think in policy, not doctrinal terms." Indeed, in one letter I
received, a partner in a major law firm, who has written extensively,
argued before the Supreme Court, and participated in numerous lobbying efforts in Congress, directly rebuts the contention that doctrinal
scholarship is not useful to legislators:
[Y]ou get uncomfortably close to conceding that theoretical scholarship
has greater utility. to the legislative than the judicial branch. I disagree
strongly, based on my experience on the Hill. In my experience, legislators are more interested than judges in practical solutions to legislative
problems, and far less interested in abstract legal theory. To the extent
that doctrinal analysis presents Congress with reasoned approaches to
concrete practical problems, it definitely is useful in the legislative process. For example, when Congress considers revising an existing law
(e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1991), or acts in a field where some legislation already exists (e.g., the Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA]),
judicial construction of existing legislation is highly relevant. I would
suggest that this is the usual case, given the breadth of federal legislation.
The one exception where doctrine has little to say lies in sketching out
the broadest theoretical outlines for a new and novel legislative program;
for example, deciding whether to handle pollution through incentives as
opposed to continued government regulation. In such situations, doctrinal scholarship does not seem of great relevance.
In this situation, however, I don't think theoretical scholarship has
much to say either.... Careful consideration of practical implementation issues enables a legislature to decide which of several competing
approaches has the greatest likelihood of success, and the greatest political merit....
In my experience, the real world uncomfortably intrudes in virtually
every legislative discussion. If you think Congress was listening to law
professors discuss theory when it came to creating the ADA or revamping Title VII, think again. They were concerned about what works in
the real world, and not ... whether their proposals satisfied the theoretical predilections of non-practicing law professors. 48
The point here, I think, is not that legal scholars committed to inform47. Law Professor #3, letter dated Dec. 16, 1992, at 1.
48. Practitioner #3, letter dated Nov. 30, 1992, at 1-2 (footnote integrated into text).
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ing and advising legislatures should only produce doctrine-oriented
scholarship, but that such scholarship is plainly of use to the legislative branch.
One chaired professor at a well-regarded midwestem law school,
seeking to extend the debate on the meaning of "practical" scholarship, suggested that neither traditional doctrinal work nor existing interdisciplinary research could meet the requirements of a "new"
practical scholarship:
I ... see a need for some change in practical scholarship and teaching. Mainly, the practical approach needs a stronger connection to underlying substance, which is increasingly diverse and complex and
demands ever finer balances among competing interests. I do not argue
for Professor George Priest's model in which applied science or something else displaces legal doctrine. Rather, I argue for tying practical
scholarship and practical law teaching more closely to the concrete, substantive areas that the law regulates so that the latter more fully and
better informs the former.... My approach is fundamentally conceptually different from Priest's because I aim to enrich and bolster traditional pragmatism which Priest would abandon.
I would also argue for integrating law with the overarching, supplemental sciences of management information and decision making. We
train lawyers to argue positions. We do not train lawyers to judge their
arguments. We teach lawyers to spot issues but not how to resolve
them....
In the end I hope for practical generalists who will enable the law
instead of impractical specialists who would destroy it. 49

Finally, an assistant professor of law at a small midwestem law
school recalled, from his own time in practice (as a law clerk, an attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice, and a private practitioner),
how unprepared for practice the graduates of a number of law schools
were:
I've heard judges on [a federal court of appeals], representing a wide
spectrum of philosophical and judicial views, uniformly express great
concern with the lack of preparation exhibited by law clerks hired from
the elite schools.... I remember judicial clerks from [various elite institutions] who candidly admitted how astonished they were to learn that
federal judges actually cared about things like statutes and precedent and
did not simply decide cases according [to] their subjective views of the
best political outcome. This was not what they had been told by their
critical legal studies professors. The naivete shown by these law clerks
would have been amusing, had it not also been rather discouraging and
frightening. so
49. Law Professor #9, letter dated Dec. 17, 1992, at 1-2.
50. Law Professor #13, letter dated Dec. 31, 1992, at 1-2.
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The professor blamed this situation on the growing disjunction between legal education and the legal profession.
In addition to voicing general concerns about scholarship and
teaching, several respondents focused on the question of ethics. A few
made clear that they shared my general view that the pressure to act
unethically has become greater in recent years, and that law schools
have not adequately responded to this problem by making a greater
commitment to teaching ethics. 51 One of the more in-depth considerations of possible reforms in ethics teaching came from a chaired professor at an "elite" law school:
I despair of the law school's ability to correct the problems you mention
through ethics education or of the profession's ability to do anything
about ethics through testing or other certification requirements....
The one hope I hold out for teaching ethics in law school is that if we
can have students rehearse specific ethical problems before they confront
them in a pressured practice context, and if we can encourage them to
strongly commit themselves to ethical courses of action while not under
pressure, perhaps they will be able to hold out better when asked to do
the unethical. This perspective suggests a very different way of teaching
ethics than that we now engage in. Rather than teach ethical rules, I
think we should focus on ways of acting ethically. Thus I would pay less
attention to what the line is between ethical and unethical discovery
practice and more to having students role play ways in which they might
resist partners' demands that they seek discovery simply to wear down
an opponent. 52

I do not dispute either that teaching ethics may be an uphill battle, or
that developing and implementing the necessary reforms will take considerable effort and commitment. I am not, however, prepared to "despair" over the law schools' inability to bring abc;mt positive change. I
still remember the great teachers that I had in law school, ·who taught
ethics as a part of their substantive course offerings. They had a powerful impact on me, so I know it can be done.
I am reluctant to attempt any summary of the views of the law
professors from whom I have heard. Indeed, anyone familiar with the
academy knows that it would be oxymoronic even to suggest a
"faculty consensus" on any subject. Nonetheless, in a number of the
letters that I received, I did note a buoyant tone - almost a sense of
relief to have the issue out in the open. Typical of this tone is a letter
from a chaired professor at an "elite" law school, who expressed "appreciation" for the article and then lightheartedly observed:
[A]s a treatise-writer, I approach the subject with some degree of bias,
51. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 73 (concluding, based on survey of my former law clerks,
that "a 'strong foundation in ethics' is not being built in legal education").
52. Law Professor #12, letter dated Nov. 23, 1992, at 4.
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but I thought your perspective made especially compelling some of the
concerns that I have reflected in my grumblings at the coffee-table. I
didn't know that I had so many good arguments, but now I do. Righton!53

Other practical scholars were equally grateful that the growing disjunction in law has been brought to the fore, but they also expressed a
deep bitterness-testament to apparent feelings of isolation and insignificance. A poignant example of this is found in the response from a
professor of law at a well-regarded, midwestern law school:
Your [article has] restored dignity, self-esteem, and courage to those of
us who have dedicated our lives to the daunting and lonely task of publishing authoritative treatises .
. . . Few in academia have cared ... whether my work is any good (a
perfectly legitimate issue, of course); instead, the work has consistently
been belittled as unworthy of a real scholar. What began in joy has been
transformed into a process of increasingly isolated despair....
Your writing has retaught me what I should never have forgotten: I
may be an inferior scholar, but not because of my choice of publications.
This means more to me than you can imagine. 54

C. Students and Recent Graduates

Several students and recent graduates wrote to me, expressing their
concerns about the problems identified by the article, particularly the
trend toward more and more interdisciplinary and theory-oriented
courses in law school curricula. (I have also heard many such comments from the law clerks with whom I have worked and from the
students I have taught over the past decade.) No doubt those who
wrote and spoke to me do not speak for all law students. But the
responses I include here do indicate a significant element in student
sentiment. A recent graduate of one of the "elite" law schools stated:
I'm sad to report that many of the systemic and institutional criticisms
you level against the "elite" law schools apply to [my alma mater, including] ... [t]he proliferation of boutique legal specialties within the
law school; the appearance of young faculty members with no practical
experience, clerkships or other significant credentials except for maybe a
graduate degree in social science; and the patronizing view of some
faculty toward students who pursue a more traditional legal education.
. . . I believe some of the classes I took were from the brightest and
most rigorous minds in the legal academy. But I worry for the future,
and I hope the Dean and the [hiring committee at my alma mater] take
your article very seriously. 55
53. Law Professor #15, letter dated Nov. 24, 1992, at 1; see also supra text accompanying
note 37.
54. Law Professor #16, letter dated Apr. 13, 1993, at 1.
55. Recent Graduate #1, letter dated Jan. 22, 199[3], at 1.
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The idea that we should "worry for the future" because of current
hiring policies was presented even more forcefully in a letter from a
third-year student at an "elite" law school. This student also offered
several trenchant observations on the general drift toward "impractical" courses:
First, I wholeheartedly agree with your complaint that Law Schools
are becoming too much like graduate schools. Before attending Law
School I went to graduate school for four years, but after getting my
degree I decided to change careers. A primary motivation underlying
my decision was that what I learned in graduate school, while interesting
and stimulating, simply wasn't practical enough. I wanted a more
"hands-on" sort of career where I could work with real people and real
problems. Before enrolling, I knew virtually nothing about the current
of change running through the legal academy and was quickly discouraged at how much time is devoted to abstract problems of little practical
significance.
In my first year, I had a roughly equal number of "practical" and
"interdisciplinary" professors. After reading your article I was struck by
how significant the differences in pedagogic approach really were.
"Practical" professors gave me the tools to tackle more advanced subjects and without even realizing it I have gravitated towards courses
taught by professors with similar styles. Consequently, there are gaps in
my education because I have avoided courses on potentially useful and
interesting topics because I knew the professors had little to offer that I
could someday apply.
·
Second, if anything, I think you underestimate the strength of the
changing tide you have identified. This year I am fortunate enough to
serve as one of the student representatives to the faculty hiring committee. I have been profoundly discouraged at the types of people the
faculty has chosen to invite for campus interviews. So far this semester
we have heard from only "impractical" scholars. Their credentials were
fine and their talks were interesting but what they are interested in seems
completely beside[] the point. Throughout my time at [this law school]
the students have bee1,1 asking for more [practical courses and professors
to teach them]. With one exception . . . these complaints have gone
unheeded.
·
I really fear for [this law school]. Within the next few years, many of
the most distinguished professors here . . . will be approaching retirement. I would place all of these people squarely in the "practical" camp
and they remain among the most loved members of the faculty. But,
they are being replaced by people of a very different stripe. I won't name
names, but I think it is true, and the students recognize it, that the
younger professors have a very different agenda. 56

A recent graduate of a large, highly regarded law school in the
midwest added that the student-run law review boards should share
some of the blame for the existing quality of scholarship today:
56. Student #1, letter dated Nov. 27, 1992, at 1-2.
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I think it is time for the students at the law reviews to start demanding
better articles. I served on [my law school's law review]. I recently
picked up the last issue - curious to see what it contained. Quite honestly, I could not understand two of the articles. As you note, the audience for these articles are not the people who have anything to do with
actually shaping the law. 5 7

The ideals of ethical practice and a commitment to public service
were also a source of concern. The third-year student quoted above
reinforced the point that massive law school debts may greatly influence the career choices of students who might otherwise seek more
public-oriented jobs when they first graduate:
[Y]our observations about students' creeping materialism and lack of interest in public service are accurate, but, I think you have ignored one
significant aspect of the problem, the cost of legal education. When I
graduate, I will owe approximately $75,000 and be facing loan payments
of roughly $1000 per month. This is a real dilemma for me and many of
my friends. I don't want to let finances dictate my career choices but at
the same time they are hard to ignore. At this point, I can't honestly say
which path I will take. It is not a decision I relish. 58

This student also related a truly troubling description of his law
school's apparent expectation that its graduates should go on to big
law firms and bring in hefty salaries:
I think one unexpected side-effect of the tremendous rise in starting
salaries at the "elite" law firms has been to change the way Law Schools
project revenues and balance budgets. I remember a talk given by the
Placement Director my first year in school. [The Director] explained
why tuition was so high and financial aid so scarce. [The Director then]
said the school could afford to be tight-fisted because they expected us to
go out and make a lot of money, both in the summer and after we graduate. I know times are tough for all colleges and universities ... but this
attitude seems short-sighted. Not only are young lawyers expected to
become fungible billing units for their firms, they are expected to become
cash cow alumni for their alma mater. 59

The specters of law school debts and limited career choices are concerns that I have heard over and over again from law students in recent years.
D. Members of the Bar

A number of practicing attorneys responded to the article, including the managing partners of several major law firms, as well as former
presidents of both the American Bar Association and the New York
State Bar Association. These attorneys shared my concerns about the
57. Recent Graduate #2, letter dated Jan. 23, 1993, at 2.

58. Student #1, letter dated Nov. 27, 1992, at 2.
59. Id.

August 1993]

A Postscript

2213

importance of reemphasizing practical scholarship and pedagogy and
the necessity of preserving (through teaching and through vigilant efforts by practicing lawyers) a set of norms that serve as the foundation
for ethical practice.
· The thoughts of the managing partner of a large law firm in Atlanta, Georgia are representative of the considerable alienation from
the academy that a number of practitioners expressed:
For several years now, I have been experiencing a growing sense of
alarm at what you call the disjunction between legal education and the
legal profession. To me, it is far more serious than the neutral term
"disjunction" implies. At its worst, it is a rejection of the fundamental
principles of the American legal system. Movements such as critical
legal studies, critical race studies, feminist legal studies, alternative jurisprudence and "story telling" are all too often highly politicized, ideological movements that do little for the tradition of principled decision
making which is at the heart of American notions of fairness. Worse
than that, three years of observing the intemperate clashes among professors adhering to conflicting schools of thought does little to advance a
student's understanding of ethical practice and the importance of dealing
with adversaries candidly and courteously. 60
Several lawyers conveyed a sense of alienation from the academy in
briefer, but no less biting, remarks. For example, an eminent appellate
practitioner opined that "[t]here is a substantial amount of 'emperor's
new clothes' being peddled in the law schools these days." 61 And a
distinguished partner in a major law firm called the disjunction between teaching and practice "the elephant sitting in the comer of this
profession for too many years now." 62 Plainly dubious of the practical
skills of the newest generation of legal scholars, he added:
I dearly would love to see some of the younger "theoretical" members of any major law faculty argue a real case in front of the Supreme
Court (sans doctrine, of course), or even argue a tough motion before a
smart [United States] District [Court] judge.... Alternatively, I'd like to
see them sit down privately with members of the House or Senate, and
answer their questions about how to craft a fair and workable piece of
legislation, based solely on theory. If they actually tried this, maybe the
dichotomy you identified wouldn't exist any more. On the other hand,
many of them would be so bad at it that things might get worse, not
better. 63
A former president of the American Bar Association and nationally known lawyer suggests that law schools could make considerable
60.
61.
62.
63.

Practitioner #2, letter dated Feb. 1, 1993, at 1.
Practitioner #4, letter dated Dec. 8, 1992, at 1.
Practitioner #3, letter dated Nov. 30, 1992, at 1.
Id. at 3.
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progress in curricular reform by increasing the teaching role of practitioners and judges:
Developments in law school curricula in recent years (frequently in
the schools not numbered as the "elite") strongly suggest that by better
relating legal education to lawyer performance in the world of lawyering
it is indeed possible effectively to teach prospective lawyers ... and with
great benefit both to the student and to the legal profession.
I would suggest that a quality program of sequential instruction in
lawyering skills and values, rich in both conceptual and practical elements, augmented by the participation of judges and experienced lawyers
in the academic program, can insure that prospective lawyers learn their
lawyering skills in a manner that will permit them to build upon a sound
doctrinal framework and confidently to undertake things they have
never done before and to accomplish appropriate results in the clientcentered world of lawyering. 64

Several practitioners were also plainly troubled by the tension between ethical practice and the persistent drive for increased profits.
The managing partner of a prominent firm in Chicago, with offices in
many other cities, remarked:
As to the state of the profession, I think the problem is quite serious,
particularly among the very well paid lawyers (in large firms and small),
many of whom like to think that they set a good tone for the perpetuation of professional values. When the goal of lawyers is to maximize
their own interest against the interests of their clients and, indeed, society, and when the goal of partners is to maximize their earnings against
the earnings of other partners, we really cease to deserve the special
treatment we seek as a profession and not as a business. I feel very
strongly about this .... That means that we never lead the Hit Parade in
the financial performance tables that are published by our friends at [a
popular legal periodical] - so be it. 6s

A named partner at one of the major law firms in Washington, D.C.,
suggested that principles of ethical practice do, in fact, influence the
behavior of many firms and individual lawyers:
I must also agree with much of your criticism of the profession for
the growing emphasis on commercialism and the bottom line. However,
at the same time there are many lawyers and law firms who resist these
pressures and remain devoted to the principle that the practice of the law
is affected by the public interest.
After all, it was the organized bar, speaking primarily through the
ABA, that saved the Legal Services Corporation, and it was the leaders
of the bar who responded to President Kennedy's call and established
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Happily, that tradition, that sense of public obligation, is still alive despite other
64. Practitioner #5, letter dated Dec. 8, 1992, at 1-2.
65. Practitioner #6, letter dated Jan. 6, 1993, at 1-2.
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pressures. 66

This same partner opined that effectively teaching ethics depended
in significant part on having faculty members who have been practicing lawyers and have experienced, firsthand, the ethical problems
faced by practitioners:
Indeed, I have always thought that it is a good idea for law teachers to
have some experience in practice before they go into teaching - to have
some exposure to what goes on in the real world and how there can be
difficult and even excruciating problems of conflicts, ethics, candor, and
even civility which are beyond the contemplation of one who has not
experienced them in practice. 6 7

The responses from these and other practitioners are significant
not only because they tend to support the thesis that there is a disjunction between the academy and legal practice, but because they support
that thesis in many of the same ways as the responses received from
members of the academy.
E. Members of the Judiciary
My colleagues on the bench also expressed significant agreement
with the view that there is a disjunction between legal education and
legal practice. A large measure of the responses I received from judges
were simple concurrences, such as one Supreme Court Justice's note
that the article "coincides with many of my concerns about the legal
profession today." 68 Others were more animated in their observations.
One U.S. Court of Appeals judge quipped, "Your criticism of legal
education is right on target. The more I hear about what is going on
in law schools, the more it seems like never-never land. " 69 Another
U.S. Court of Appeals judge simply declared, "Amen!" 70
I also received lengthier reflections on the topics treated in the article. One U.S. Court of Appeals judge sharply criticized what he perceived as the pernicious effects of the trend toward more "impractical"
work, a trend he traced to student demands for changes in the law
school curriculum:
The only place I part company with you in your article is that I think
you have made too many concessions to political correctness. Although
I believe the law schools have an obligation to listen to the various student constituencies who have some very valid points to make, I do not
believe that the response of the law schools in tinkering with the curricu66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Practitioner #1, letter dated Nov. 25, 1992, at 2.
Id.
Justice #2, letter dated Nov. 24, 1992, at 1.
Judge #3, undated letter, at 1.
Judge #4, letter dated Nov. 20, 1992, at 1.
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lum in the manner they have done is the appropriate one. At most of the
elite law schools today, there are no required courses after the first year.
In the second and third years oflaw school, students no longer study law
but, rather, graze their way through a smorgasb[or]d of boutique offerings more closely aligned to the social sciences than the law. Although
LSAT scores may be higher than ever, I am shocked at the number of
poorly trained young men and women who[m] I see emerging from the
nation's finest law schools.
My concerns in this area are exacerbated by the direction in which
most of the nation's elite law schools are heading. [The "elite" law
school at which I teach a course] is a classic example. The law faculty
for all practical purposes selects the dean, or at least has veto power over
anyone suggested, and together with the dean, they become a tightly knit
screening committee, making sure only those of similar ilk are
admitted....
It is . . . hard to mount much of a hue and cry from the alumni.
When I attend ... meetings [at the law school], for example, most of the
people who return are caught up in their justifiable love for [their alma
mater] and the nostalgia they feel as a result of being back [here] ....
That, coupled with the dog and pony show invariably put on by the law
school, is not likely to generate any great outcry against what is going on
today. 71

One U.S. Court of Appeals judge was not as negative in his appraisal of the current state of legal education. This judge suggested
that the primary problem in legal education was merely the obsolescence of the case method:
I am not in disagreement with the overemphasis on "Law-and" courses.
I do think that the Law Schools can do clinical work and do the basic
core courses well.... But I do disagree with what I think is your conclusion that the Law Schools are failing in their mission of turning ou[t]
good lawyers, or that the bar is really more critical of the product than it
was 25 years ago. I think that the problem has much more to do with
the fact that the great reform of Langdell has outlived its usefulness, and
that the case method of teaching is unworkable. This has more to do
with the fact that judges (read Justices) write too long, too multifariously, and too independently. It isn't only that there are no Oliver Wendell Holmes type justices; it's that his model is not deemed worthy of
emulation by any judges. Judges always think it's more important that
they voice their unique ratio decidendi for every case that comes before
them. As a result, every important case sheds more confusion than light,
and as teaching tools they are awful. 72

I agree that the case method has its drawbacks, and that it can
actually be a liability in advanced courses. But I do not believe that
the pedagogical problems in law schools today can be reduced to the
observation that Langdell's approach may be obsolete. In addition,
71. Judge #1, letter dated Feb. 5, 1993, at 2.
72. Judge #5, letter dated Dec. 13, 1992, at 1.

A Postscript

August 1993]

2217

even if the profession is no more critical today than it was twenty-five
years ago of the quality of either the graduates or the scholarly research produced by law schools (a point I am not prepared to concede), that fact alone is hardly a justification for complacency on the
part of law schools. 73

Ill.

CONCLUSION

As I have already acknowledged, it is surely unwise to generalize
with too much certainty about a set of responses such as those I received in reaction to my article. I ·do believe, however, that the responses collected here indicate that I am by no means alone in my
concern for the current state of legal education and the legal profession. To me, then, the question is no longer whether there is a problem, or even what the basic nature of the problem is. Rather, in my
view, our mission now should be to search for solutions.
The American Bar Association's report on Legal Education and
Professional Development - An Educational Continuum, 74 written by
a distinguished panel oflegal practitioners and scholars, is a step in the
right direction. Fortunately, there have been noteworthy follow-ups
to the ABA Task Force Report: in February 1993, Emory University
School of Law sponsored a major conference on excellence in the legal
profession, focusing on a number of the issues covered by "The Growing Disjunction"; in April 1993, New York University Law School
convened a gathering of practitioners and law faculty members to discuss the implications of the Task Force Report; in June 1993, Case
Western Reserve University Law School, along with the Center for
Professional Responsibility of the ABA and the American Bar Foundation, hosted a conference of leaders in the legal profession from
around the country to consider an agenda for the profession for the
next century; and, of course, there is this symposium edition of the
Michigan Law Review, devoted principally to the issues raised in "The
Growing Disjunction." Open dialogue on these issues is bound to
help.
There are skeptics, however. One law professor at a major eastern
law school posed the following question:
Upon reading the article, I was struck b[y] how reasonable and even
73. Furthermore, given the problems now being faced by the practicing bar, some cynics
might wonder whether practitioners' assessments rest on a flawed set of values. For some recent
commentary on the plight of law firms, see generally Barbara Buchholz, The Melting Pots,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 62; Don J. DeBenedictis, Growing Pains, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 52;
Patrick Capuano, All This and Fired, Too, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 58.
74. See supra note 6.
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modest your proposal is. You do not argue that legal academics should
stop engaging in pure theory, but merely that they should realize that
there is an important role for practical scholarship as well. This, to my
mind, leads to an interesting question: If your proposal is so sensible,
why doesn't it immediately meet with universal acceptance? (I am predicting that it won't.)75

He is of the view that, because the "political" divisions in law faculties
are too great and those in power have too much to lose, meaningful
change is unlikely. A nationally recognized, preeminent chaired professor from a major east coast law school viewed the problem in somewhat similar terms, but was a bit more optimistic:
Hopefully, the [ABA] Task Force Report will also help to nudge some
law schools back onto the road oflaw, if only by giving deans who want
to move in that direction some ABA-backed language to quote to potential funding sources. (As you indicate, nudging is probably the best tool
for the task at this point. Cudgeling mules with sticks is seldom the
formula for progress, but the particular breed of mule now dominating
legal education seems too dumb to appreciate the nourishment value of
carrots.)76

I hope that these skeptics are wrong, but I too harbor some doubts
about the capacity of the profession to right itself. As a start, I think
that those of us who lobbied to open up the law schools to the perspectives of other disciplines and ways of thinking may bear a special responsibility to ensure that law schools retain their basic sense of
purpose. But the entire legal academic community must work collectively to find a middle ground where a greater number of practical
scholars flourish alongside their theory-oriented counterparts in an environment of mutual respect; both should contribute to an education
for students that better prepares them for practice, and both should
share the fundamental belief that scholarship that seeks to inform and
guide practitioners, legislators, other policymakers, and judges is a valuable, indeed necessary, component of any law school's mission. Nor
should the academy be the only focus of attention. The members of
the practicing bar must - if they wish to remain in a profession - put
forth a significantly greater effort toward achieving the ideal of ethical
practice, an ideal from which too many firms and individual attorneys
appear to have strayed.
I applaud the Michigan Law Review for sponsoring this symposium, for it helps to further an important public debate. However, we
are all familiar with the epigram that "when all is said and done, a lot
more is said than done." Symposia are generally focused on saying,
75. Law Professor #4, letter dated Dec. 22, 1992, at 1.
76. Law Professor #14, letter dated Dec. 4, 1992, at 1.
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not doing, and I fear that without a great effort by the legal community as a whole, our well-meaning discussions will not lead to concrete,
effective, and lasting reforms in the academy and in the profession.
This failure would be a tragedy, for we have already focused our
thinking enough to identify and analyze the problems we face. It is
now time to pursue solutions to the growing disjunction between legal
education and the legal profession.

